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1  Introduction
The information revolution is affecting our understanding about the world and 
about ourselves: we are interconnected informational organisms that share with bio-
logical organisms and engineered artefacts “a global environment ultimately made 
of information,” i.e., what Luciano Floridi calls “the infosphere” (Floridi 2013). A 
crucial feature of this new environment has to do with the complex ways in which 
multi agent (human/artificial) systems interact. This informational complexity chal-
lenges concepts and ways of reasoning through which, so far, we have grasped basic 
tenets of the law and politics. The starting point of the analysis concerns the use of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs): whereas, over the past centu-
ries, human societies have been ICTs-related but mainly dependent on technologies 
that revolve around energy and basic resources, today’s societies are increasingly 
dependent on ICTs and, moreover, on information as a vital resource. In a nutshell, 
we are dealing with ICTs-driven societies (Floridi Forthcoming).
What this huge transformation means, from a legal and political viewpoint, can 
be illustrated with the ubiquitous nature of the information on the internet. The flow 
of this information transcends conventional boundaries of national legal systems, 
as shown by cases that scholars address as a part of their everyday work in the 
fields of information technology (IT)-Law, i.e., data protection, computer crimes, 
digital copyright, e-commerce, and so forth. This flow of information jeopardizes 
traditional assumptions of legal and political thought, by increasing the complexity 
of human societies. ICTs-driven societies are in fact characterized by a collective 
behaviour, which emerges from large networks of individual components, without 
central control, or simple rules of operation. In addition, these systems present a so-
phisticated signalling and information processing, through which they adapt to the 
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environment and, what is more, spontaneous orders evolve through such informa-
tional complexity. Although, in his seminal book The Sciences of the Artificial (new 
ed. 1996), Herbert Simon used to warn that complexity is “too general a subject to 
have much content,” he pinpointed cases where this approach to the complexity 
of the subject matter can particularly be fruitful: “particularly classes of complex 
systems possessing strong properties that provide a fulcrum for theorizing and gen-
eralizing can serve as the foci of attention” (Simon 1996, p. 181).
Here, we can start appreciating how the complexity of ICTs-driven societies af-
fects canonical tenets of legal and political thought, in four different ways. Figure 1 
helps me illustrate this informational approach to the complexity of current legal 
systems.
First, the idea of the law as a set of rules enforced through the menace of physical 
sanctions ( e.g., Kelsen 1949) often falls short in coping with the new legal and po-
litical challenges of the information revolution: identity thefts, spamming, phishing, 
viruses, and cyber attacks have increased over the past decade, regardless of harsh 
national laws like the US anti-spam act from 2003. Furthermore, a number of issues, 
such as national security, cyber-terrorism, availability of resources and connectiv-
ity, are systemic, that is, they concern the whole infrastructure and environment 
of today’s ICTs-driven societies and, thus, these issues have to be tackled at inter-
national and transnational levels. Unsurprisingly, national law-making activism is 
short of breath, and this is why constitutional powers of national governments have 
been joined—and even replaced—by the network of competences and institutions 
summarized by the idea of governance. Leaving aside how this profound transfor-
mation affects the sovereignty of national states, much as democratic processes and 
models of political legitimacy, attention should be drawn to how often the modern 
state’s monopoly of power and legitimate violence is over in this context. National 
sovereign states, although still relevant, should be conceived as one of the agents 
in “the formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the 
public realm,” that is, how Hyden, Court and Mease define the notion of gover-
nance (in Grindle 2005, p. 14).
Second, the scenario of ICTs-driven societies appears increasingly complex 
since the quantity of information grows and its theoretical compression decreases 
(Chaitin 2005). To be fair, this trend is not new: some have summed it up with 
the very process through which pre-modern communities converted into industrial 
and ICTs-related societies, up to current post-industrial, or ICTs-driven, societies 
(di Robilant 1973). Others have traced this complexity back to the emergence of 
Fig. 1  The legal complexity of ICTs-driven societies
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spontaneous orders with multiple political and legal sources: for instance, in Chap-
ter 2 of the first volume of Law, Legislation, and Liberty (1973), Hayek affirms 
that “one of our main contentions will be that very complex orders, comprising 
more particular facts than any brain could ascertain or manipulate, can be brought 
about only through forces inducing the formation of spontaneous orders” (Hayek 
1982, p. 38). Whilst this latter analysis dwelt on the forces of local customs, inter-
national uses, and transnational markets, what is original today concerns the evo-
lutionary processes of spontaneous orders that are ICTs-dependent, ubiquitous and, 
well, “complex.” Contemplate the political, legal and economical relevance of what 
scholars present as network effect (Pagallo 2006; Pagallo and Ruffo 2007; Ormerod 
2012). On this basis, legislators, policy makers and, generally speaking, governance 
actors shall preventively understand the nature of the field in which they aim to 
intervene or, maybe, to interfere: in a word, today’s kosmos and the evolution of 
spontaneous orders “onlife” as opposed to the taxis of governance and the construc-
tivism of political planning.
Third, the information politics of ICTs-driven societies is far more complex than 
ICTs-related ones because governance actors should not only be grasped as deter-
mining the rules of the game through laws, statutes, agreements, and so forth. In ad-
dition to the traditional hard and soft law-tools of governance, such as national rules, 
international treaties, codes of conduct, guidelines, or the standardization of best 
practices, the new scenarios of the information revolution have increasingly sug-
gested the aim to govern current ICTs-driven societies through the mechanisms of 
design, codes and architectures. Admittedly, some of these technological measures 
are not necessarily digital and yet, current advancements of technology have obliged 
legislators and policy makers to forge more sophisticated ways to think about legal 
enforcement. All in all, most of today’s legal and political challenges of the infor-
mation revolution have to do with the twofold features of “generative technologies” 
(Zittrain 2008), such as, say, the personal computers and the ways PCs ubiquitously 
transmit information on the internet. Although this technology allows innovation, 
experimentation and the wide-open Web of creative anarchy, PCs permit the spread 
of spam, viruses and copyright infringements, that call into question the aforemen-
tioned notion of the law as (i) made of commands; (ii) enforced through physical 
sanctions; (iii) within the territory of a sovereign state. Some countries, like China, 
have built up systems of filters and re-routers, detours and dead-ends, to keep inter-
net users on the state-approved online path. Other states, such as France or South 
Korea, have endorsed the so-called “three strikes”-doctrine, as a part of the gradu-
ated system which ends up with the user internet disconnection after three warnings 
of allegedly copyright infringements. At the end of the day, we should evaluate 
governance actors as game designers that deal with the twofold features of genera-
tive ICTs, in accordance with the different aims design may have, namely the aim 
to change people’s behaviour, the aim to decrease the impact of harm-generating 
conducts; or, even, to prevent such harm-generating conducts from occurring.
Finally, the increasing complexity of today’s ICT-driven societies affects the 
meaning of traditional legal concepts, such as reasonable foreseeability, liability, 
responsibility, and “legal causation.” Consider the use of unmanned aerial sys-
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tems (UAS), and the current debate on whether and how we should change the 
EU Regulation 216/2008 and even the 1948 Chicago Convention on International 
Civil Aviation, so as to allow the (semi-) autonomous flight of the drones. Here, 
we have to pay attention to the responsibility of UAS operators, manufacturers, 
maintenance and safety contractors, air traffic controllers or contracting parties, 
that interact with autonomous or semi-autonomous machines, to avoid ground dam-
age, air-to-air collisions, communication interferences, piracy, environmental con-
cerns, illegal searches in constitutional law, down to violation of the landowner’s 
right and claims of nuisance and trespass in tort law. The increasing capability of 
machines to be “independent of real time UAS-pilot control input,” according to 
the UK Defence Standards definition of autonomous flight (2011), impacts on the 
traditional ability of philosophers (and lawyers) to sever the chain of responsibil-
ity via notions of causation and “fault.” In his 1996 paper Liability for Distributed 
Artificial Intelligence, Curtis Karnow (Karnow 1996) proposed the example of “a 
hypothetical intelligent programming environment which handles air traffic con-
trol” such as “Alef.” The advancement of AI technology and, generally speaking, of 
autonomous artificial agents would ultimately break down “classic cause and effect 
analysis.” Additionally, it seems problematic to determine the types of harm that 
may supervene with the functioning of an entire processing system such as Alef’s. 
In the phrasing of Karnow:
No judge can isolate the ‘legal’ causes of injury from the pervasive electronic hum in which 
they operate, nor separate causes from the digital universe which gives them their mutable 
shape and shifting sense. The result is a snarled tangle of cause and effect as impossible to 
sequester as the winds of the air, or the currents of the ocean ( op. cit.).
The different ways in which this flow of information jeopardizes basic assumptions 
of the law and politics is stressed throughout this volume. Luciano Floridi calls for 
“a new philosophy of politics among us” Yiannis Laouris draws the attention to 
how “future societies will have to design and implement technologies and policies 
to safeguard the true individual human rights and freedom” Sarah Oates dwells on 
the nature of the public agora that “should be conceptualized and protected in a way 
that tips the balance away from the elites and toward the citizens” May Thorseth 
insists on the possibility of public use of reason in the realm of digital transition, 
since “a virtual reality may very well be communicative in a Habermasian sense” 
Charles Ess and Mireille Hildebrandt cast light on modern Western conceptions of 
liberal democracies and power relations in non-state societies, so as to “illuminate 
questions of trust and virtual experiences as critical components of ‘onlife’ in new 
ways”. Whilst these issues are intertwined with the impact of digitalization “on our 
processes of knowing,” Judith Simon presents such issues as “the epistemic respon-
sibilities in entangled digital environments.”
In this chapter the aim is to reassess these ideas in connection with the concept of 
“governance” and, in particular, of “good enough governance” as developed by the 
United Nations over the past decades, that is, from Kofi Anan’s inauguration speech 
as UN Secretary-General in July 1997, to work by Merilee Grindle (2002, 2005, 
and 2010; however, I will refer only to Grindle 2005). Consequently, this chapter is 
presented in four sections: as in Plato’s early dialogues, it seems fruitful to start with 
Good Onlife Governance: On Law, Spontaneous Orders, and Design 165
some definitions in Sect. 2, namely the different ways in which scholars refer to the 
idea of “governance.” Then, attention is drawn to three different levels of analy-
sis that concern the notion of “good onlife governance,” that is, the ethical, legal 
and technological challenges of the information revolution, as examined in Sect. 3. 
Next, the focus is on the kosmos-side of the “onlife experience” via the network ap-
proach illustrated in Sect. 4: the aim is to emphasize how the topological properties 
of today’s ICTs-driven societies and their kosmos affect the political planning of 
lawmakers and, hence, any good onlife governance. Finally, these ideas are deep-
ened with the distinction between game players and game designers in Sect. 5. In 
addition to the traditional hard and soft law-tools of governance, the governance of 
complex multi-agent systems that interact “onlife,” does increasingly hinge on the 
technicalities of design mechanisms.
2  Defining Governance
We have already seen how the information revolution jeopardizes key traditional 
assumptions of legal and political philosophy, such as the state’s monopoly of the 
legitimate use of force and the law conceived as a set of rules enforced through the 
menace of physical sanctions. Whilst an increasing number of issues have to be ad-
dressed at international and transnational levels, national sovereign states should be 
considered as one, albeit relevant, agent in the network of competences and institu-
tions summarized by the idea of governance.
In Good Enough Governance (2005), Merilee Grindle provides eight meanings 
of governance: in this section, it suffices to quote two of them. On the one hand, 
according to the World Bank, the idea of governance concerns “the process and in-
stitutions through which decisions are made and authority in a country is exercised” 
(in Grindle 2005, p. 14). On the other hand, Hyden, Court and Mease refer to “the 
formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the public 
realm, the arena in which state as well as economic and societal actors interact to 
make decisions” ( ibid.). On this basis, the notion of governance can be furthered 
as a matter of “good” governance. In the case of the World Bank, focus should 
be on inclusiveness and accountability established in three key areas, namely, 
(i) “selection, accountability and replacement of authorities”; (ii) “efficiency of in-
stitutions, regulations, resource management”; and, (iii) “respect for institutions, 
laws and interactions among players in civil society, business, and politics.” In the 
case of Hyden, Court and Mease, the concept of good governance can be measured 
along six dimensions, i.e., “participation, fairness, decency, efficiency, accountabil-
ity, and transparency,” in each of the following arenas: “civil society, political soci-
ety, government, bureaucracy, economic society, judiciary.”
Drawing on such definitions, Merilee Grindle has objected to the length of the 
good governance agenda, because “interventions thought to contribute to the ends 
of economic and political development need to be questioned, prioritized, and made 
relevant to the conditions of individual countries. They need to be assessed in light 
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of historical evidence, sequence, and timing, and they should be selected carefully 
in terms of their contributions to particular ends” (Grindle 2005, p. 1). By following 
this methodological approach to what should be deemed as “good enough,” what 
are then the issues that ought to be questioned, prioritized and made relevant, so as 
to pinpoint what is new in the legal and political dimension of our concept reengi-
neering exercise?
In his brilliant In Search of Jefferson’s Moose (2009), David Post proposes an 
analogy between the American West of 1787 and today’s cyberspace:
Cyberspace is not the American West of 1787, of course. But like the American West of 
1787 is (or at least it has been) a Jeffersonian kind of place… And like the West of 1787, 
cyberspace poses some hard questions, and could use some new ideas, about governance, 
and law, and order, and scale. The engineers have bequeathed to us a remarkable instru-
ment, one that has managed to solve prodigious technical problems associated with com-
munication on a global scale. The problem is the one that Jefferson and his contemporaries 
faced: How do you build “republican” institutions—institutions that respect equal worth of 
all individuals and their right to participate in the formation of the rules under which they 
live—that scale? (Post 2009, pp. 116–117)
The question begets three different levels of analysis. The first viewpoint is ethical 
and has to do with the foundation of any good onlife governance; the second level is 
both legal and political, since it concerns the distinction between the emergence of 
spontaneous orders in the legal field, and human (political) planning; the third per-
spective is related to the aim to embed legal safeguards into ICTs and other types of 
technology. From a methodological stance, each level of abstraction can be grasped 
as an interface made up of a set of features, that is, the observables of the analysis 
(Floridi 2008). By changing the interface, the analysis of the observables and vari-
ables of the three levels of abstraction should strengthen our comprehension of the 
onlife experience and, more particularly, of today’s governance. In accordance with 
some principles of information ethics (Floridi 2013), the emergence of spontane-
ous orders, and matters of design and scale, what is new in the legal and political 
dimension of our concept reengineering exercise is thus pinpointed through such 
observables of the analysis, as the right balance between representation and resolu-
tion at the first level of abstraction; notions of nodes, diameters of the network, and 
links, to grasp the second level of abstraction, and so forth. These different levels 
of analysis, discussed separately in the next section, are illustrated with Fig. 2. The 
aim is to shed light on what ought to be prioritized, and made relevant, in our con-
cept reengineering exercise as that which is “good enough” in the governance of the 
onlife experience.
Fig. 2  “Good Enough” in 
the governance of the onlife 
experience
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3  Three Levels of Analysis
The first level of analysis concerning any good onlife governance regards the foun-
dations of what Floridi conceives as an “efficient” and “intelligent” multi-agent 
system, the model of which may represent a goal that could successfully orient our 
political strategy in terms of transparency and tolerance: “Finding the right balance 
between representation and resolution, while implementing the agreement to agree 
on the basis of ethical principles that are informed by universal human rights, is a 
current major challenge for liberal democracies in which ICTs will increasingly 
strengthen the representational side.” On the basis of this right balance between 
representation and resolution, we have thus to assess how the information revolu-
tion reshapes models of political legitimacy and democratic processes, much as re-
publican institutions that shall “respect equal worth of all individuals” (Post 2009). 
Since this is the subject matter of Floridi’s contribution in this volume (see above, 
pp. xx–xx), let me skip this part of the analysis.
The second level concerns Friedrich Hayek’s classical distinction between kos-
mos and taxis, i.e., evolution vs. constructivism, spontaneous orders vs. human 
(political) planning. Recent empirical evidence confirms that the informational 
complexity of human interaction is not reducible to taxis alone and, moreover, 
orders spontaneously emerge from the complexity of the environment through 
specific laws of evolution (Pagallo 2010). Most of the time, today’s research on 
governance, good governance, and good enough governance focuses on the taxis-
side of political dynamics, namely, the decisions of institutional, societal, and eco-
nomical actors, as a set of rules or instructions for the determination of other infor-
mational objects and agents in the system. Still, we should reflect on the properties 
of the onlife multi-agent systems as a complex network that adapts to the environ-
ment through learning and evolutionary processes, such as sophisticated signalling 
and information mechanisms. Complex systems are characterized by a collective 
behaviour that emerges from large networks of individual components, although 
no central control or simple rules of operation direct them. Accordingly, legislators, 
policy makers and, generally speaking, governance actors shall preventively under-
stand the nature of the field in which they aim to intervene or, maybe, interfere (Pa-
gallo 2012a). The point can be illustrated with a metaphor of Lon Fuller: “The law 
can act as a gardener who prunes an imperfectly growing tree in order to help the 
tree realize its own capacity for perfection. This can occur only when all concerned 
genuinely want the tree to grow, and to grow properly. Our task is to make them 
want this.” Of course, as it occurs with all the metaphors, we should take Fuller’s 
parallel with a pinch of salt: in the case of the good onlife governance, the “tree” 
can indeed strike back, as shown by how many attempts to govern the dynamics 
of complex multi-agent systems on the internet have been unsuccessful because of 
the response of the kosmos. Recall the US Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the 
Protect IP Act (PIPA), and how these bills miserably failed in winter 2011–2012.
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The third level of the analysis can be summed up with the distinction between 
game players and game designers (Floridi 2013; Pagallo 2012b). Although political 
planning does not exhaust the complexity of human interaction, it does not fol-
low, pace Hayek, that taxis cannot shape the evolution of kosmos. On the contrary, 
political decisions can determine the rules of the game as well as the very architec-
ture of the system. Consider the ways some Western democracies and authoritarian 
regimes alike have specified the functions of state action on the internet. As men-
tioned above in the introduction, the “three strikes”-doctrine has been endorsed by 
some countries, such as France or South Korea, to enforce copyright laws, whereas 
systems of filters and re-routers, detours and dead-ends, have been adopted by such 
countries, as China, to keep individuals on the state-approved online path. Although 
some of these architectural measures are not necessarily digital, e.g., the installation 
of speed bumps in roads as a means to reduce the velocity of cars, current advance-
ments of technology have obliged legislators, policy makers, and governance actors 
to forge more sophisticated ways to think about legal enforcement and, moreover, 
the information revolution has made such decisions a critical part of the governance 
of the entire system. This is why, on 19 April 2012, Neelie Kroes properly insist-
ed on the open structure of the internet and its neutrality as key principles of this 
very governance: “With a truly open, universal platform, we can deliver choice and 
competition; innovation and opportunity; freedom and democratic accountability” 
(Kroes 2012, p. 2).
These different levels of analysis, to be sure, affect each other: game designers 
should take into account the development of spontaneous orders, much as, say, the 
transparent governance of a complex multi-agent system can ultimately hinge on 
the technicalities of design mechanisms. By paying attention to the specificity of the 
political dimension in our concept reengineering exercise, however, let me prevent 
a twofold misunderstanding. At times, scholars address the challenges of the infor-
mation revolution to the traditional models of political legitimacy and democratic 
processes as if the aim were to find the magic bullet. Vice versa, others have devoted 
themselves to debunk these myths, such as a new direct online democracy, a digital 
communism, and so forth, by simply reversing the paradise of such techno-enthu-
siasts (Morozov 2011). All in all, we should conceive today’s information revolu-
tion in a sober way, that is, as a set of constraints and possibilities that transform 
or reshape the environment of people’s interaction. On one hand, this profound 
transformation affects norms, competences, and institutions of today’s governance, 
much as people’s autonomy and the right of the individuals to have a say in the de-
cisions affecting them. What is at stake here revolves around a new “right balance” 
between representation and resolution: suffice it to mention the debate on the role 
that national sovereign states should have in today’s internet governance, vis-à-vis 
such technical organizations as, for example, ICANN. On the other hand, what 
makes the governance of ICTs-driven societies unique concerns how the properties 
of today’s kosmos may affect political planning and, hence, the design of any good 
onlife governance, i.e., the second and third levels of abstraction illustrated with 
Fig. 2 above. Next section deepens this latter viewpoint with some tenets of net-
work theory and, more particularly, in accordance with the topological properties of 
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today’s online kosmos and the emergence of spontaneous orders. Then, Sect. 5 
brings us back to the taxis side of the onlife governance, by examining the ways 
in which the decisions of game designers can impinge on collective and individual 
autonomy.
4  The Topology of Onlife Networks
Several spontaneous orders on the internet present the topological features of scale 
free-networks and “small worlds.” To grasp how the complexity of such topological 
properties affect any political planning, have a look at Fig. 3 with the key param-
eters of every network, namely (i) its nodes, (ii) the average distance between nodes 
or diameter of the network, and (iii) its clustering coefficients. This allows us to 
single out three models.
The first one is represented by a regular network in which all of the nodes have 
the same number of links: this network has high clustering coefficients but a long 
diameter since the degree of separation between nodes is high.
The second model is a random network with opposite features: it presents low 
clustering coefficients but a very short diameter. The explanation is that random 
links exponentially reduce the degree of separation between nodes in the network.
The third model is a small world-network: its peculiarity depends on the appar-
ent deviation from the properties of both regular and random networks. Like regular 
networks, small world-networks present high clustering coefficients, but they also 
share with random networks a short characteristic path length, i.e., the nodes of the 
network need few steps in order to reach each other.
As you can see, in light of Fig. 3, in the regular network there are 20 nodes, 
each of which has 4 links, so that the blue node (the brighter one on the left) would 
need at least 5 steps to reach the red one (the brighter on the right). What is striking 
with a small-world network is how random links exponentially reduce the degree 
Fig. 3  Three topological models
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of separation between nodes: for instance, if 3 nodes are randomly rewired, the 
degrees of separation decrease from 5 to 3. This means that, in a circle of 6 billion 
(people) nodes as our world could be represented today, if random links in the net-
work would be about 2 out of 10,000, the degree of separation turns out to be 8. But 
if they are 3 out of 10,000, then 5!
Since the pioneering work of Stanley Milgram (1967) and, later, of Mark 
Granovetter (1973), the idea of small world-networks became in few years one of 
the key words of contemporary scientific research by fostering a large set of empiri-
cal studies on the topology of complex systems. Significant effort has been made 
in order to structure analytical models able to capture the nature of small world-
networks. Here, it suffices to mention only two of these. The first small world-
model was proposed by Duncan Watts and Steven Strogatz (1998): they suggested 
to randomly rewire a small fraction of the edges belonging to a low-dimensional 
regular lattice so as to prove that the degrees of separation in the network would ex-
ponentially decrease. Yet, contrary to random networks, the shortening of the diam-
eter proceeded along with high clustering coefficients as in regular networks. These 
small world-features explain the results of Milgram’s and Granovetter’s research 
because short diameters of the network and high clustering coefficients quantify 
both the low degrees of separation between two citizens picked up randomly in such 
a complex network like the American society studied by Milgram in the mid 1960s, 
and the “strength of weak ties” stressed by Granovetter in the early 1970s.
The second analytical model we need to examine was defined by Albert-Lászlo 
Barabási (2002): he noted that most real world networks, such as the internet, grow 
by continuous addition of new nodes whereas the likelihood of connecting to a node 
would depend upon its degree of connectivity. This sort of special attachment in a 
growing system explains what Watts and Strogatz apparently missed, namely, the 
power-law distribution of the network in a topological scale-free perspective: small 
world-networks in the real world are indeed characterized by few nodes with very 
high values and by most nodes with low connectivity. The presence of hubs or of a 
small fraction of nodes with a much higher degree than the average offers the key 
to comprehend why small world-networks can be both highly clustered and scale-
free. This occurs when small, tightly interlinked clusters of nodes are connected into 
larger, less cohesive groups.
Drawing on this research, we can deepen the notion of complexity mentioned in 
the introduction. Today’s onlife kosmos can indeed be comprehended in accordance 
with the nature of the hubs and the degree of their connectivity in a small world 
network, because the emergence of spontaneous orders, e.g. peer-to-peer (P2P) 
file-sharing systems on the internet, often goes hand in hand with the hierarchical 
structure of these networks (Pagallo and Durante 2009; Glorioso et al. 2010). Sig-
nificantly, in The Sciences of the Artificial (new ed. 1996), Herbert Simon insisted 
on this point, i.e., the notion of “hierarchy” as the clue for grasping the architec-
ture of complexity and, moreover, the idea of “nearly decomposable systems” that 
reconciles rigid top-down and bottom-up approaches. In the wording of Simon, 
“the clusters of dense interaction in the chart” of social interaction “will identify a 
rather well-defined hierarchic structure” ( op. cit., p. 186). Furthermore, according 
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to the “empty world hypothesis,” the term of near decomposability denotes that 
“most things are only weakly connected with most other things; for a tolerable 
description of reality only a tiny fraction of all possible interactions needs to be 
taken into account” (Simon 1996, p. 209). Recall the difference between regular 
networks, random networks, and small worlds, mentioned above: Simon’s “empty 
world hypothesis” corresponds to the notion of hubs, since such hubs not only offer 
the common connections mediating the short path lengths between the nodes of the 
network, but also elucidate the clusters of dense interaction and complexity in the 
chart of social relationships.
These topological properties of the network introduce a crucial point on how the 
structure of the kosmos may affect the political planning of the taxis and, hence, any 
“good onlife governance.” Whilst I assume that there is no kosmos without taxis in 
the “onlife experience,” governance actors should really know the subject matter 
which they intend to govern. The point can be illustrated with the words of Paul 
Ormerod:
In a scale-free network, we know that we need to identify the well-connected individuals 
and to try by some means to induce them to change their behaviours. In a random network, 
we know that there is a critical value of the proportion of agents we need to influence in 
order to encourage or mitigate the spread of a particular mode of behaviour or opinion 
across the network. This at least gives us an idea of the scale of the effort required, and 
tells us that money and time which is unlikely to generate the critical mass is money and 
time wasted. In a small-world context, targeting our efforts is more difficult, but at least we 
know that it is the long-range connectors, the agents with links across different parts of the 
network, or who have connections into several relevant networks, who are the most fruitful 
to target. (Ormerod 2012, p. 275)
Yet, a crucial aspect of the analysis concerns more the evaluation, than the descrip-
tion, of the kosmos, which taxis aims to discipline. Lawmakers, policy makers and 
governance actors should not only know whether they are dealing with a random 
network, a small-world network, a scale-free network, and so forth, since they have 
to evaluate the kind of information that is distributed according to the topological 
properties of a regular network, a random network, etc. Consider the following 
spectrum in the field of social interaction, which empirical evidence has proved 
to be a small world network: at one end, the “small worlds” of the internet in the 
early 2000s and their positive effects (Barabási 2002); at the other end, what the 
COPLINK program illustrated in the mid 2000s, namely that “narcotics networks 
are small-world with short average path lengths ranging from 4.5–8.5 and have 
scale-free degree distributions with power law exponents of 0.85–1.3” (Kaza et al. 
2005). In between, we find more controversial cases, such as the “small worlds” of 
some P2P networks as Gnutella (Pagallo and Ruffo 2007). In light of this spectrum, 
let me reassess the different levels of analysis illustrated above with Fig. 2. From 
an ethical viewpoint, what should be avoided or minimized is the “impoverishment 
of the infosphere,” or entropy, whilst “the flourishing of informational entities as 
well as the whole infosphere ought to be promoted by preserving, cultivating and 
enriching their properties” (Floridi 2006). From a legal and political stance, what 
is at stake here concerns the ways in which the new scenarios of the information 
revolution have suggested national and international lawmakers more sophisticated 
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forms of legal enforcement, complementing the traditional hard tools of the law, 
much as softer forms of legalized governance, such as the standardization of best 
practices and guidelines, through the mechanisms of design, codes, and IT architec-
tures. Many impasses of today’s legal and political systems can indeed be tackled, 
by embedding normative constraints and constitutional safeguards into ICTs. After 
the topological properties and ethical challenges of the current kosmos, let me ex-
amine this taxis-side of the onlife governance separately: the next section explores 
how game designers may shape the onlife experience.
5  The Design of the Onlife Experience
The concept of design can be understood as the act of working out the shape of 
objects: we actually mould the form of products and processes, together with the 
structure of spaces and places, so as to comply with regulatory frameworks. Such a 
shaping is not necessarily digital: as mentioned above in Sect. 3, consider the instal-
lation of speed bumps in roads as a means to reduce the velocity of cars (lest driv-
ers opt to destroy their own vehicles). Still, the information revolution has obliged 
policy makers to forge more sophisticated ways of legal enforcement through the 
design of ICT interfaces, default settings, self-enforcing technologies, and so forth. 
According to the phrasing of Norman Potter in his 1968 book on What is a Designer 
(new ed. 2002), a crucial distinction should be stressed between designing spaces 
(environmental design), objects (product design), or messages (communication de-
sign). Moreover, in their work on The Design with Intent Method (2010), Lockton, 
Harrison and Stanton describe 101 ways in which products can influence the behav-
iour of their users. In light of Fig. 4, it suffices to focus on three different ways in 
which governance actors may design the onlife experience.
First, design may aim to encourage the change of social behaviour. Think about 
the free-riding phenomenon on P2P networks, where most peers tend to use these 
systems to find information and download their favourite files without contribut-
ing to the performance of the system. Whilst this selfish behaviour is triggered by 
many properties of P2P applications, like anonymity and hard traceability of the 
nodes, designers have proposed ways to tackle the issue through incentives based 
on trust ( e.g., reputation mechanisms), trade ( e.g., services in return), or alterna-
tively slowing down the connectivity of the user who does not help the process of 
file-sharing (Glorioso et al. 2010). For example, two very popular P2P systems, 
namely µTorrent and Azureus/Vuze, have inbuilt anti-leech features that cap the 
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download speed of the users, if their upload speed is too low (note that a low upload 
speed may in turn hinge on the policy of some ISPs that count both uploads and 
downloads as monthly data quota). In addition, design mechanisms can induce the 
change of people’s behaviour via friendly interfaces, location-based services, and 
so forth. These examples are particularly relevant because encouraging individuals 
to change their behaviour prevents risks of paternalism, when the purpose of design 
is to encourage such a change of behaviour by widening the range of choices and 
options. At its best, this latter design policy is illustrated by the open architecture of 
a web “out of control” (Berners-Lee 1999).
Second, design mechanisms may aim to decrease the impact of harm-generating 
behaviour rather than changing people’s conduct, that is, the goal is to prevent the 
impoverishment of the agents and of the whole infosphere, rather than directly pro-
moting their flourishing. This further aim of design is well represented by efforts 
in security measures that can be conceived of as a sort of digital airbag: as it oc-
curs with friendly interfaces, this kind of design mechanism prevents claims of 
paternalism, because it does not impinge on individual autonomy, no more than 
traditional airbags affect how people drive. Contrary to design mechanisms that 
intend to broaden individual choices, however, the design of digital airbags may 
raise issues of strong moral and legal responsibility, much as conflicts of interests. A 
typical instance is given by the processing of patient names in hospitals via informa-
tion systems, where patient names should be kept separated from data on medical 
treatments or health status. How about users, including doctors, who may find such 
mechanism too onerous? Furthermore, responsibility for this type of mechanisms is 
intertwined with the technical meticulousness of the project and its reliability, e.g., 
security measures for the informative systems of hospitals or, say, an atomic plant. 
Rather than establishing the overall probability of a serious accident, focus should 
be here on the weaknesses in the safety system, ranking the accident sequences in 
connection with the probability of their occurrence, so as to compare different event 
sequences and to identify critical elements in these sequences. All in all, in Eugene 
Spafford’s phrasing, it would be important that governance actors, sub specie game 
designers, fully understand that “the only truly secure system is one that is powered 
off, cast in a block of concrete and sealed in a lead-lined room with armed guards—
and even then I have my doubts” (in Garfinkel and Spafford 1997).
Third, there is the most critical aim of design, namely to prevent harm gen-
erating-behaviour from occurring through the use of self-enforcing technologies, 
such as DRMs in the field of intellectual property protection, or some versions of 
automatic privacy by design ( e.g., Cavoukian 2010). Of course, serious issues of 
national security, connectivity and availability of resources, much as child pornog-
raphy or cyber-terrorism, may suggest endorsing such type of design mechanism, 
though the latter should be conceived as the exception, or last resort option, for 
the governance of the onlife experience. Contemplate some of the ethical, legal, 
and technical reasons that make problematic the aim of design to automatically 
prevent harmful conduct from occurring. As to the ethical reasons, specific design 
choices may result in conflicts between values and, vice versa, conflicts between 
values may impact on the features of design: we have evidence that “some technical 
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artefacts bear directly and systematically on the realization, or suppression, of par-
ticular configurations of social, ethical, and political values” (Flanagan et al. 2008). 
As to the legal reasons against this type of design policy, the development and use of 
self-enforcing technologies risk to curtail both collective and individual autonomy 
severely. Basic tenets of the rule of law would be at risk, since people’s behaviour 
would unilaterally be determined on the basis of technology, rather than by choices 
of the relevant political institutions: what is imperilled is “the public understanding 
of law with its application eliminating a useful interface between the law’s terms 
and its application” (Zittrain 2007).
Finally, attention should be drawn to the technical difficulties of achieving such 
total control through design: doubts are cast by “a rich body of scholarship concern-
ing the theory and practice of ‘traditional’ rule-based regulation [that] bears witness 
to the impossibility of designing regulatory standards in the form of legal rules that 
will hit their target with perfect accuracy” (Yeung 2007). Indeed, there is the techni-
cal difficulty of applying to a machine concepts traditionally employed by lawyers, 
through the formalization of norms, rights, or duties: after all, legal safeguards often 
present highly context-dependent notions as, say, security measures, personal data, 
or data controllers, that raise a number of relevant problems when reducing the 
informational complexity of a legal system where concepts and relations are sub-
ject to evolution (Pagallo 2010). To the best of my knowledge, it is impossible to 
program software so as to prevent forms of harm generating-behaviour even in such 
simple cases as defamations: these constraints emphasize critical facets of design 
that suggest to reverse the burden of proof when the use of allegedly perfect self-
enforcing technologies is at stake. In the wording of the US Supreme Court’s deci-
sion on the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) from 26 June 1997, “as a matter 
of constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume 
that governmental regulation… is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of 
ideas than to encourage it.”
6  Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was to cast light on some of the issues that ought to 
be questioned, prioritized, and made relevant, so as to stress what is specific to the 
legal and political dimensions of the onlife governance. Starting with current defi-
nitions of governance, good governance, and good enough governance in Sect. 2, 
the analysis dwelt on the complex ways in which multi-agent systems interact in 
light of the difference between kosmos and taxis, on one side, and between game 
players and game designers, on the other. By taking into account the examples of 
local customs, international uses, and transnational markets, that is, the traditional 
forms of spontaneous orders examined by a Nobel laureate (Hayek 1982), what is 
critical today concerns, on the one hand, the evolutionary processes of multi-agent 
systems that are ICTs-dependent, ubiquitous, and moreover, cannot be reduced to 
the taxis-side of governance. Going back to the debate on the ethical foundations of 
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today’s cyberspace, e.g., David Post’s republican institutions that shall respect the 
equal worth of all individuals, it is admittedly an open question how such institu-
tions should be built, and even conceived of (Post 2009; Solum 2009; Reed 2012; 
etc.): yet, the paper has shown how often the efficiency and legitimacy of traditional 
hard and soft-law tools of governance depend on what scholars present as “network 
effect.” Legislators, policy makers and, generally speaking, governance actors shall 
preventively understand the political, legal and economical relevance of what spon-
taneously emerges and evolves onlife, namely that which we discussed above in 
Sect. 4.
On the other hand, what is specific of today’s onlife governance revolves around 
the role of game designers. In addition to the debate on the institutional issues of 
current governance, and how its traditional hard and soft law-tools should be dis-
tributed among political authorities, societal actors, and economic players, such as 
lobbies and stakeholders, the challenges of the information revolution have induced 
complementing such tools, e.g., guidelines and best practices, through the mecha-
nisms of design, codes and architectures. This new scenario affects basic pillars of 
the law and democratic processes, by reshaping the balance between resolution and 
representation, much as the right of the individuals to have a say in the decisions 
affecting them. Here, the three levels of analysis discussed above in Sect. 5 are criti-
cal. When the aim is to broaden the range of people’s choices, so as to encourage the 
change of their behaviour, such design policy is legally and politically sound: this 
approach to design prevents threats of paternalism that hinge on the regulatory tools 
of technology, since it fosters collective and individual autonomy. Likewise, the aim 
of design to decrease the impact of harm-generating behaviour through the use of 
digital airbags, such as security measures or user friendly interfaces, respects col-
lective and individual autonomy, because this approach to design does not impinge 
on people’s choices, no more than traditional airbags affect how individuals behave 
on the highways. Yet, to complement the hard and soft-law tools of governance by 
design entails its own risks, when the aim is to prevent harm-generating behaviour 
from occurring.
Although many impasses of today’s legal and political systems can properly be 
addressed by embedding legal safeguards into ICT and other kinds of technology, 
there are several legal, ethical and technical reasons why the use of allegedly per-
fect self-enforcing technologies raises serious threats of paternalism and, even, of 
authoritarianism. Whether DRMs, automatic versions of the principle of privacy 
by design, three-strikes approaches, China’s “Great Firewall,” or Western systems 
of filters in order to control the flow of information on the internet, the result is the 
modelling of individual conduct. As game designers dealing with the challenges 
of the information revolution, this paper suggested why governance actors ought 
to consider the use of self-enforcing technologies as the exception, or a last resort 
option, to minimize the informational entropy of the system or, vice versa, to pro-
mote its flourishing and that of its informational objects. What is at stake here is 
“complex,” because the legal and political challenges of the information revolution 
often concern the whole infrastructure and environment of people’s interaction. Re-
cent statutes, such as HADOPI in France, or DEA in UK, show how new ways of 
protecting citizens even against themselves do materialize.
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